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Ambiguities Of Mourning
Law, Custom, Literature and Women before
South Africa's Truth And Reconciliation
Commission
Mark Sanders
No justice -let us not say no law and once again we are not speaking
here of laws - seems possible or thinkable without the principle of
some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins
the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or
who are already dead, be they victims ofwars, political or other kinds
of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of
extermInations, victims ofthe oppressions ofcapitalist imperialism or
any of the forms of totalitarianism
-Jacques Derrida
Currentlywinding down its work ofhearing testimony to human
rights abuses of the apartheid era, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission is an ambitious undertaking. 1A counterpart to the
Reconstruction and Development Programme, a long-term
scheme for the creation ofhousing, infrastructure and jobs, the
Truth Commission is part of a vast effort at nation-building in
post-apartheid South Africa. By asking South Africans to
remember, the Truth Commission seeks to come to terms, not
only with the crimes of the apartheid era, but with a 350-year
history of white domination. In the words of Justice Richard
Goldstone, former UN Chief Prosecutor for War Crimes
Tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, (One ofthe most important
advantages of the TRC [is] that it w[ill] write the past forever
into South Africa's history' (Pretoria News August 18 1997). The
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Truth Commission aims at what no program of reconstruction
and development could achieve by material means alone. In the
minds of its proponents, it aims at nothing less than the
'deansHng], and 'moral and cultural reconstruction' of a society
(Chikane 1995: 99, Sachs 1995: 106). It has as its goal the 'healing
of a nation' socially and psychically sundered into fragments by
apartheid (see Boraine and Levy 1995).
By what means does the Commission set out to realise its
goals? Though its goals are ambitious, its means are seemingly
modest. Itwill build no houses, electrify no townships, and create
no jobs. Guided by the goal of national reconciliation, all it has
done is solicit the truth from witnesses called upon to provide
information which could aid it in its goal of 'establishing as
complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of
the gross violations of human rights' of the period 1960..1994
(Promotion ofNational Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995).2 The
Commission seeks to bring forward, as it distinguishes them,
the 'victims' as well as the 'perpetrators'. In terms ofa controversial
provision designed to bring to light what court cases would be
likely to obscure, 'perpetrators' applying to the Amnesty
Committee can exchange a 'full disclosure' of rights violations
for amnesty from criminal and civil prosecution.3 In order to
qualify for amnesty, 'the act, omission or offence ... to which the
application relates is an act associated with a political objective
committed in the course of the conflicts of the pase, and the
Committee must assess 'the relationship between the act, omission
or offence and the political objective pursued, and in particular
the directness and proximity of the relationship and the
proportionality of the act, omission or offence' (Promotion of
National Unity andReconciliation Act 1995 subsections 3 [1] [b],
20 [1] [b] and 20 [3] [fD. Although the amnesty hearings have
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at times been marred by the delaying tactics of lawyers, a great
deal of information about covert security operations has come
before the public eye. What has captured the hearts ofobservers,
though, is the testimony heard at the human rights violation
hearings. As Antjie Krog writes, looking ·hack: (The last victim
hearings finished five months ago, and the focus has been lost.
No more the voices, like a leaking tap in the back ofyour mind,
to remind you what this Commission is all about' (Krog 1998:
236-7).
A nationwide publicity drive, supported by church,
community and support groups like the Johannesburg-based
Khulo.mani - Speak Out! -, has encouraged ordinary people to
come forward: to name their torturers, the murderers of their
children, and to claim recompense.4We are witnessing, as Kendall
Thomas writes, 'the elaboration ofa new social ethics ofdiscourse'
(Thomas 1997: 188). The process of testifying is an open one,
with public hearings broadcast live on radio (the mass medium
accessible to the largest number ofSouth Africans), and covered
regularly by South African Broadcasting Corporation television,
both live and in a weekly wrap-up, Truth Commission Special
Report. This openness distinguishes the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission from most truth commissions to date. 5 Many
'victims' have come forward. Some find the process helpful.
Others do not: recalling and re-enacting old traumas is not of
benefit for all. Leaving the representations of 'perpetrators' for
another occasion, it is on the testimony of those people who
come forward as 'victims' that I concentrate here.
After due corroboration, a report will be tabled from the
representations of(perpetrators' and 'victims'. The intention is to
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present, with the aid ofprefatory material, a historical context in
which to interpret these testimonies. Through its final report,
which is to be submitted-to the President in October 1998, the
Commission will give official imprimatur to what was in many
cases surmised, and circulated as common knowleclge. For
instance, everyone knows that Black Consciousness leader Steve
Biko was murdered while in detention, but not everyone,
particularly among Whites, has wanted to believe it. The same is
true for a number ofthe other high-profile cases. But, more than
this, the stories of ordinary women and men are being
acknowledged. Eventually, if it succeeds, the Commission will
have transformed the country's fragmented 'collective memory'
into a shared national history. This will not be a history of bare
facts, bllt one judged, and thus shaped, according to the norms
of universal human rights.
Speaking as a witness before the Commission thusimplies
being enjoined to frame one's testimony according to the de.mands
of universal human rights. As a perpetrator or a victim, one
testifies to a transgression ofhuman rights: either one has violated
those pf another, or one's own have been violated. Soliciting
testimony in this way makes apparent ambiguities in cases which
do not fit, in an obvious way, into the paradigm ofhuman rights
guiding the Commission's work. The cases I have in mind involve
the interface between universal human rights and assertions by
human rights violation witnesses in the name of'custom' .Appeals
for funeral rites, invitations to join in the work of mourning,
these cases reveal a disjuncture, endemic to postcolonial Africa,
between law and custom. Concentrating on one testimony, I
show how such instances reveal the limits of advocative
representation -letting someone speak is too often ventriloquism
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- similar to testimonial literature, a literature of protest and
solidarity. They reveal to us, on the other hand, the agency of
black w0!Uen is exposing the disjuncture ofcustom and law, and
the drawbacks ofadvocative representation. What an examination
ofthis testimony shows, above and beyond this, is a responsibility
to, and before, the dead or deceased, bound to the hearing of
another injunction in the law. Addressed to a body of human
rights, the demand for funeral rites - for and before the other -
evokes, from the law, another 'law', perhaps that which Derrida
gives the name 'justice'. Summoned before the dead, the
Commission at once takes up and forecloses this responsibility.
The Body
Observers ofthe human rights violation hearings have been struck
by the frequency with which witnesses testifying as 'victims' claim
the restitution of a body, or of body parts. The survivors seek to
accord the dead proper funeral rites, and to enlist the aid of the
Commission in doing so (Minkleyet al1996: 9ff, Ignatieff 1997).
Although not anticipated by the Commission, and not budgeted
for, more than 50 bodies, many those of African National
Congress guerillas, have been dug up exhumed from pauper's
graves, or from unmarked graves on isolated farms (Krog 1998:
204-5, Daley 1-998). In a separate initiative, it has recently been
announced, the bodies of the first six political activists to be
hanged in the 1960s are being exhumed for reburial at a specially-
built 'Heroes Memorial' in Port Elizabeth (Cape Times June 22
1998).
There has been some debate about the cultural significance
of the demand by witnesses for the bodies of family members.
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Foreign journalists have insisted on its racial and ethnic
specificity:6 The domestic media have, however, been more
cautious. Early in the life ofthe Commission, Truth Commission
Special Report ran a feature on what it termed the 'symbolic
reburial' ofbodies. Although awhite psychologist was interviewed
for commentary, all of those presented as approaching the
Commission for 'reburial', or just to find Information, were black
(Truth Commission SpecialReportJune 16 1996). In a subsequent
program, presenter Max du Preez, a respected left Afrikaans
journalist, sought to dispel the impression that this was 'a black
cultural thing'. Featured was the widow of a white farmer who
had disappeared without trace one day from his farm, later said
to have been killed by guerillas (Truth Commission SpecialReport
September 29 1996). A good case can be made for such
journalistic balance when white SouthMrican mourning practices
pass as culturally unmarked. Yet, in this instance, Du Preez's
attempt at balance may obscure the significance of the fact that
black witnesses, many of them women, have been the ones to
bring the issue offuneral rites, to general notice.7 Their demands
are, performatively speaking, quite different.
An intriguing instance oftestimony, in this respect, is that
of Lephina Zondo, mother of Andrew Zondo, an African
National Congress guerilla executed, despite activism on his
behalf, for his part in the bom.bing of a shopping mall in
Amanzimtoti in 1985 (see Meer 1987, Lalu & Harris 1996).
Here is an extract from Lephina Zondo response to questions




Lephina Zondo: ....There was a lawyer, Bheka, (who] represented
him. He came back (and] told us that [Andrew had] been sentenced to
death five times because of what·he did at Amanzimtoti. They took
him to Pretoria, they transferred him to Pretoria. We visited him quite
often [there] .... The police arrived at home to tell us that the day has
arrived for him to be hanged, and they said we should go and see him.
We left as a family ... we stayed there for a weekend.
They said that we can stay in Pretoria but we'll never see his
body. We said: 'Yes, that is better. Can you make it possible so that we
can see his body?'
They said: 'No. You will not see his body. You won't be allowed
to see his bod)!. You can go and attend the church service but you will
never see the body'.
We felt that if we go and don't see the body because it's our
custom, before a person ,can be buried we have got to look at him and
be sure that it is the right person. And thereafter we came back and
they buried him.
They said that they would bury him at Mamelodi and they said
they would give us a death certificate after that, but we never received
any death certificate.
There was this heavy burden in our hearts. Why didn't they
give us a death certificate because they already hanged him. They said
no, it's the law, they had to bury him. They said ev~n jfwe can go we
will not see him...
Alex Boraine: Don't... don't rush. When you are ready then
you can continue.... Is that your full story?
Lephina Zondo: ~bo [yes].
Alex Boraine: Thank you. I wont keep you long because you
have carried a very heavy load and you have been very brave. Just one
or two short questions....
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Alex Boraine: Mrs Zondo, the commission is here to share in
your pain and your distress. Is there anything that you would like the
commission to do ifthe commission had the power to do that? Is there
anything more you want to say?
Lephina Zonda: ....we do not have a death certificate and we
cannot go to the place where my son is buried.
Alex Boraine: Mrs Zondo, we will certainly consider your request
and we will very definitely be able to get hold of the death certificate
so that you can have it. We will also make enquiries, I'm really not sure
what the law is, but we will make enquiries about your son's body and
we will come back to you and tell you what we have found out. I hand
you now over to the chairperson.
Lephina Zondo: Thank you very much.8
Lephina Zondo's testimony is intriguing to read in the
context ofMax du Preez's hesitation over the cultural and racial
specificity ofcodes ofmourning. She testifies that the family was
never allowed to see the body of their son~ 'They said: "....You
will not see his body. You won't be allowed to see his body"'. The
Prisons Act 1959 provides for the 'near relatives' of an executed
prisoner to arrange his or her burial, under the supervision of
the prison authorities'- This is a provision implemented at the
discretion of the Commissioner of Prisons. The restitution of
the body is, as the Act is written, the exception; prisoners' bodies
are legally available to medical schools as cadavers.9 Andrew
Zondo's family did not arrange his burial, and the Reverend Aiken
Zondo, Andrew's father, was not permitted to see his body, or to
attend the burial arranged by the prison.10 Withholding the
corpse, specifically sight of the corpse, represents a disruption of
usual funeral rites, of the work ofmourning which a family, and
community, would customarily carry out. Blocked are the usual
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affective transactions, what it is the family and comrnunity's
custom or habit (umkhuba wethu) to do: 'We felt that if we go
and don't see the body because it's our custom [umkhubawethu],
before a person can be buried we have got to look at him and be
sure that it is the right person'''1
The phrase 'because it's our custom' disrupts the syntax of
her testimony. It also points beyond the Commission's mandated
domain ofgross human rights violations. At one level, the phrase
is an explanation for Boraine, whom she appears to position as
one ignorant of 'custom'. At another level, though, there is the
sense that, when she replies, she responds before another authority.
There is no doubt that the hearing is set up to learn of rights
violations 'done to' her or to her son {though, in the case of
executions, it is not clear how closely the Commission is sticking
to its brief),12 and that the Commissioner asking the questions
plays his part as if this is so. There is, however, no reason to
assume that the witness is heing written by the same script. This
is not necessarily a case of subversion. From somewhere in
Boraine's questions and prompts comes the call for another
response. If Boraine is the other, we could say that this is a call
which comes from the other of the other. To that other, Lephina
Zondo gives the name 'custom', and attributes to it an imperative:
'before a person can be buried we have got to look at him and be
sure that it is the right person'. Audible somewhere in the soliciting
of testimony to human rights violations is the call of 'custom';
here as the imperative to look at the body before preparing it for
burial. For this call to be heard, and for the response ofthe witness
to be heard as if it had not been heard - that is to say, in this
instance, to be received as testimony to rights violation -
emphasises how the Commission operates not only to reveal the
113
Sanders
crimes of apartheid, but to expose the social rifts and fissures
which are the legacy of almost 350 years of colonial and q~asi­
colonial rule.
Lephina Zonda's testimony leads us to the complicated
interface of custom and human rights. As we approach this
interface, we cannot assume custom to be an unambiguously
good thing. In South Africa, culture is political, and 'custom' is
contested. Aspects of 'customary law', especially as they affect
women, are, for instance, seen by some human rights lawyers as
being in conflict with basic human rights. And some would view
the rivalry between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party as
the expression of the conflict between custom and rights on a
national scale (see Comaroff & Comaroff 1997: 401-402). The
tensions coming to the fore at the hearings between custom and
human rights, a colonial history's newest turn, may also be a sign
of an older hearkening to another authority in the law.
Custom And The Law
Strictly speaking, violations of 'custom' lie beyond the scope of
the Commission, whose task it is to investigate 'gross violations
ofhuman rights' through the 'killing, abduction, torture or severe
ill-treatment of any person' (Promotion ofNational Unity and
Reconciliation Act 1995). The violation in this case - we are not
talking about clandestine tdisappearance', the issue raised with
exhumations - is the 'legal' denial ofcustomary funeral rites, of
the usual process of laying the dead to rest.
Though 11ot, in the letter of the law, a 'gross violation' of
rights, such a denial of funeral rites may be - at least in what is
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called 'Western' thought13 - the violation ofright par excellence.
I am thinking not only ofAntigone, but also ofthe part played in
Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit by Sophocles's drama in the
section on 'TheTrue Spirit. The Ethical Order' (Der wahre Geist.
Die Sittlichkeit) - a text which can itselfcan be read as an allegory
ofthe complicated exchanges between custom and human rights.
These exchanges involve at least four languages, and several
discontinuous histories of translation.
Let us .explore how this is so. In Sophocles, Antigone
questions Creon's 'proclamation' (krnxas), the 'law' (nomos) which
prohibits her from burying her brother, Polynices, who has been
declared a traitor, and punished by being denied the honor of a
proper burial (1984: 1.500,502, 1994: 1.450,452). ForAntigone,
Creon's 'Jaw' (nomos) seeks to 'override the gods,1 the great
unwritten, unshakeable traditions (nomima) , (Sophocles 1984:
1.504-505, 1994: 1.454-455). Although, as we know, nomos, which
can be translated as custom, is usually consistent with law,
Antigone's speech demands that we not simply conflate law and
custom; that we not exclaim, all too quickly, that, here, at the
navel of Western thought, law is actuaHy at one with custom,
united in the sphere ofwhat Hegel refers to as 'the human law'
(das menschliche Gesetz); 'the known law, and the prevailing
custom' (das bekannte Gesetz und die vorhandene Sitte) (Hegel
1977: 267, 1970: 329) .14 Set apart from law (nomos) in Antigone's
speech, the word for 'traditions' is 'nomima' - customs, usages-
a word which, in other contexts, can refer to 'funeral rites'. In
the Phenomenology Hegel, to whom modern communitarian
political theory owes the determination of law, the family, and
the state as moments of the customary - Of, as it is usually
translated, the (ethical order' or 'ethical life' (Sittlichkeit) - does
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not oppose law and custom (Gesetz und ... Sitte) .15 Instead he
sees a 'rift (Zwiespalt) between divine and human law' (Hegel
1977: 285, 1970: 350). A translation of nomima as 'traditions'
or 'customs', however, allows what Hegel renders as 'divine law'
{gottliches Gesetz) to shade into the customary. Rereading Hegel
via Sophocles thus yields a tension not simply between human
law as actualised in the state, and divine law, but a rift between
what Hegel takes to be at one: civic law and custom.
There is a Sense here that Antigone hearkens to the other
of the law proclaimed by Creon: the nomima in the nomos. By
responding before that authority; she can hold Creon responsible.
The fact that, at one level, to respond before unwritten nomima
is also to respond before the dead (nomima can be rites accorded
the dead) suggests that, as the law speaks, from somewhere in it
there is another call. We could follow Derrida, and call this
responsibility before the nonliving and the living 'justice'.
Without forgetting the differences, striking parallels can
be drawn between Antigone's challenge to Creon and the
testimony of Lephina Zondo - as custom is affirmed, its
recognition sought in a forum constituted on the basis ofuniversal
human rights. Both a 'perpetrator' and a 'victim' - to use the
parlance of the Commission - Andrew Zondo is executed for
crimes against the state; except that this is a state of which he
was, in contrast to the high-born Polynices, in many ways, never
really a citizen. Having been denied access to the body of their
son, the family explai~s to the prison authorities that it is their
custom (umkhuba wethu) to see the body of the deceased.
Ndmima, custom and funeral rites, custom as funeral rites, have
been blockedby-what is procJaimed by penal officialdom as nomos:
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'They said no, it's the law'. The Commission implicitly makes
itself available to the witness in a kind of 'transference'. The
contestatory dialogue with the prison officials between custom
and law is repeated for it, and the demand made ofthe officials is
reiterated in the standard 'request' a winless is called upon to
make before the Commission. Testifying to a 'legar denial of
funeral rites as a violation of 'our custom', our habit of doing
things, Lephina Zondo petitions the Commission for concrete
means of redress: '1 would request ... we do not have a death
certificate and we cannot go to the place where myson is buried'.
Enormous differences exist, of course, between what we
find in Antigone, and in Hegel's reading, and the appeal the Truth
Commission hears from Lephina Zondo. To the more obvious
differences ofgeographical, historical and cultural location, and
occasion (law and theatre, for instance), we can add at least two
which are more telling. By attending to these differences, we can
interrogate Hegel's appropriation of Antigone and Greek
antiquity. Africa, notoriously passed over by the world spirit in
his Philosophy ofHistory as 'the land of childhood ... enveloped
in the dark mantle of Night' (Hegel 1956: 91), may yet teach
Hegel something.
First, whereas Lephina Zondo appeals on behalfofher son,
Antigone claims funeral rites for her brother, a contingent fact
(the parents of Antigone and Polynices are dead) which Hegel
transposes into the essential brother-sister relation, making it the
basis for his determination of 'the feminine' (das Weibliche) as an
actualisation of 'divine law' (Hegel 1977: 274, 280, 1970: 336,
343) - and thus, with our retranslation, an actualisation of
'custom'. Although ethnography of 'traditional' Zulu social
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formations has revealed women to have the social role ofmourners
(see Ngubane 1977: 77-99), we would not be justified in
assuming that women who testify before the Truth Commission
in order to claim a restitution of bodies do so for such reasons. 16
If it is true that, in the aftermath ofarmed conflict, women are
often the survivors (one thinks also, for instance, of the
Argentinean mothers of the·'disappeared' (see Taylor 1997: 183-
222»,17 as coverage of the Commission (see Ignatieff 1997), and
the background to Lephina Zondo's testimony show (see Meer
1987), men, as fathers, also playa leading part in the process.
We would thus be mistaken in identifying customs of mourning
with the social role ofwomen; we do not need to copy Hegel by
essentialising from the outlines ofa single case, or limited number
of cases. Nevertheless, as I shall propose below, in the post-
apartheid juncture, Lephina Zondo's testimony brings to light
some major implications specific to women.
Second, as I have begun to suggest, Hegel implicitly
assum,es law and custom to coexist amicably within the realm of
'the ethical order' or 'ethicallife' (Sittlichkeit). It is divine law
and human law which are in conflict. Hegel's larger goal, however,
is ~o outline a transition (Obergang) from the family to the state,
a transition within an ordinarily cohesive (community'
(Gemeinwesen) comprised, in effect, of 'blood relation[sJ'
(Blutsverwandten) (Hegel 1977: 271, cf27S, 1970:333, cf341).
Divine law, in the form of the family, is the motive 'element'
(Element) ofhuman law, and ofthe state (Hegel 1977: 288, 1970:
352); their coexistence is disrupted only by a deed such as that of
Antigone, which sets family against state, divine law against
human law - on our translation: custom against civic law.
118
Ambiguities ofMourning
What happens, however, when such cohesive relationships
do not exist, or ones which do are unacknowledged ofsuppressed?
When ties of blood invite a phobia ultimately legislated as
apartheid?l8 When, as in British colonial Africa, colonists enjoy
civic law, but the colonised are subject to a codified 'customary
law', in what Mamdani (1996: 16-23) calls a 'bifurcated state?'
Hegel seems not to anticipate such a situation, one which
prevailed in Equatorial and Southern Africa, attaining its most
elaborated form in the 'ethnic' Bantustans of. apartheid. His
account of colonisation (Kolonisation) in the Philosophy ofRight
proceeds exclusively from the standpoint of the (English and
Spanish) colonist, who, following an emancipation struggle akin
to that of slave and master, merely restarts the family-bourgeois
society-state teleology on new soil (Hegel 1991: 269). In his
reading of Antigone in the .. Phenomenology, Hegel does not
anticipate the possibility of 'custom' not being reconcilable with
law as actualised in the state. He does not imagine a realm ofthe
'customary', ofSittlichkeit, being a zone ofcivic and geograp4ic
marginalisation. 19 If Africa has anything to teach Hegel and
Hegelians, the lesson will come from this peculiar structure of
colonial and postcolonial African modernity. It is thus to that
structure's specific implications for post-apartheid South Africa,
and Southern Africa more generally, that we turn.
In his assessment of postcolonial Africa's legacy of late
colonialism in Citizen andSubject, Mahmood Mamdani identifies
as a problem the deracialisation ofthe upper levels ofgovernment
without a corresponding democratisation at the local level.
Mamdani traces this problem back to the structure of European
colonial rule in Mrica, which developed into an amalgam of'direct
rule' and 'indirect rule':
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Debated as alternative modes ofcontrolling natives in the early
colonial period, direct and indirect rule actually evolved into
complementary ways ofnative control. Direct rule was the form
ofurban civil power. It was about the exclusion ofnatives from
civil freedoms guaranteed to citizens in civil society. Indirect
rule, however, signified a rural tribal authori~ It was about
incorporating natives into a state-enforced customary order.
Reformulated, direct and indirect rule are better understood as
variants of despotism: the former centralised, the latter
decentralised.... Urban power spoke the language ofcivil society
and civil rights, rural power of community and culture. Civil
power claimed to protect rights, customary power pledged to
enforce tradition (Mamdani 1996: 18).
It IS cleat from this account that, in late colonial Africa, the
application of Hegel's theory of the state meets an obstacle.
Whereas, as Hegel tells us, the society of the colonists developed
along lines reproducing the dialectic of the modern European
state, colonised social formations were incorporated into the
colonial state in ways which precluded any dialectical relationship
between African custom and the realm ofcivil society and rights
(cfMamdani 1996: 15). Sittlichkeitwas torn asunder in colonial
Africa, where a domain of 'custom' was mapped out to exclude
BI~cks from the civic freedoms and rights enjoyed as a matter of
course by Whites. Apartheid was the apotheosis ofthis bifurcated
system.
In this 'bifurcated' colonial state, two, unequal, juridical
orders existed: 'customary justice was dispensed to natives by
chiefs and commissioners, black and white; modern justice to
non-natives by white magistrates' (Mamdani 1996:·} 09). The
legacy of 'customary law' is, when examined historically, not
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customary at all, but a subordinate part ofthe hierarchy ofindirect
rule. In the same· way that Mrican tribes and ethnicity were
sometimes 'inventions' of missionaries. and colonial states,
customary law was a brainchild of colonial rule (Ranger 1983,
Chanock 1985). Like post-independence Kenya, Tanzania,
Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and other African countries, post-
apartheid South Africa has a legacy of 'customary law'. First
codified in 1878, the body"ofcustomary law known as the Natal
Code became the law in Zululand in 1887 (Simons 1968: 26).
In 1927, the Natal Code became a key part of the blueprint for
customary law in the rest of the country, when the Native
Administration Act made legal dualism part of a system of
territorial segregation and indirect rule on a nationwide scale
(Simons 1968: 53). Never having been applicable to Whites,
customary law remains a juridical remnant of the almost total
exclusion ofBlacks from the realm ofcivic rights. Yet, traditional
l~aders and customary law continue to enjoy constitutional
recognition and state remuneration.
If 'custom' marked a radicalised zone setting citizen and
subject apart, 'customary law' as codified by colonial and
apartheid rulers caricatured, as it did much else, relations between
African men and women. According to Simons, 'the code
stereotypes a concept of feminine inferiority unknow~ to the
traditional society' (Simons 1968: 26). Under the still extant
'official code', women are denied proprietary and contractual
capacity, and locus standi in judicio (Bennett 1995: 86-93).
Customary law is thus in conflict with SouthAfrica's obligations
under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, and with a Bill of Rights
providingrhat: '[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly
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or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin,
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience,
belief: culture, language and birth' (Constitution ofthe Republic
o/South Africa 1996 subsection 9 [3]).20 Customary law is not
always applicable, or applied in its 'officiaf form. Yet one can
observe at an abstract level that, when and where it is, its burdens
on black women are onerous. In a realm ofthe 'customary), black
women are set apart, even more drastically than black men, denied
access to the sphere of civic law and of human rights which, in
post-apartheid South Africa, promises to include them.
How do we begin to measure the incidence ofthese factors
on an interpretation of LephinaZondo's appeal, in a forum of
rights, for an official recognition of 'our customr
So far I have put into play several issues. Our reading of
Lephina Zondos testimony over against Antigone's challenge to
Creon has taken us against the grain of Hegel's interpretation of
Sophocles, and the part it plays in his account of Sittlichkeit in
the Phenomenology ofSpirit. In colonial and postcolonial Africa)
as we have found, the Hegelian theory ofthe state encounters an
obstacle: African custom and 'customary law' is cut offfrom civil
society and the zone ofrights in a way which disrupts the Hegelian
articulation of custom and law. Like other postcolonial African
countries, South Africa is thus compelled to come to terms with
a colonial political and juridical legacy which compromises and
confuses African cultural affirmation and retrieval. For many
involved in the struggle against apartheid, culture and ethnicity
are suspect; the Bantustan system was based on a rhetoric of
cultural preservation, and, in it dying days, the apartheid state
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legalised 'traditional weapons', such as spears, axes and clubs,
carried by impis of the Inkatha Freedom Party, a notorious
instance ofthe manipulation of,custom' and 'tradition' by it and
its allies (see Sarkin & Varney 1993). Human rights issues vis-a-
vis customary law are, then, also more complicated than is usually
understood to be the case e1sewhere.21
Before returning in the final section to the specific
implications for women of customary law, rights, and the
democratisation of culture, in the next section I will return to
the less easily grasped elements of the connection I have made
between the testimony of Lephina Zondo and the challenge of
Antigone: the work of mourning, hearing the other in the law;
the work of mourning ai hearing the other in the law. From
these elements, less easily analysed in legal debates around
customary law and human rights, we can, in a cross-disciplinary
way, formulate another reading of the law and custom. Here
literature, or the literary, or even, if one is not turned away by
the difflcultyof the term, a certain 'literariness', is of major
importance. All will be lost in what I am trying to say if we
oppose law and literature, the legal and the literary. In the process
we are tracking, it is from within the constraints of the law (as
nomos in Sophocles), or at the very least from within its dramatic
mise en scene - its own literariness - that the witness bears witness
to the call of another law, of the other of the law. I would like to
suggest that this bearing witness involves, in an essential way, a
process of mourning and of commemorating the dead and a




In works of testimonial literature (and perhaps all
literature), there is a response to a law, that of the addressee or
addressees.22 Yet there is also a response to the other, or what
Levinas (1967) calls the 'trace of the other', in the addressee.
This trace is perhaps what one reads for when one reads
'responsibly'. As Lephina Zondo, like Antigone, hearkens to an
other ofthe law, in the law, she exposes a set ofhistorical paradoxes
which the Truth Commission, while it can expose them, cannot
begin to confront. Her testimony forces the Commission to bring
to light the ambiguities, in post-apartheid South Africa, ofcustom
and 'customary law': a system applying exclusively and unequally
to Blacks, and, within that zone of inequality, usually a rural
one, unequally to black women. Testimony such as Lephina
Zondo's is able, as it were, to bring the customary to crisis in its
inequalities because it is an affirmation of'our cust-om' in a forum
where a request made in its name it will be given equal
consideration. To the extent that the Commission is a body
affirming human rights, it is, given current debates about rights
and customary law, an exemplary place to reflect o.n the
democratisation of culture. If Lephina Zonda's affirmation of
'cus~om' has the pragmatics ofwhat, in another context, Judith
Butler (1997: 89-90) has described as a 'performative
contradiction' - the claim to consideration in 'universal' terms
to which one has historically been denied access - pointing toward
a possible democratisation ofculture, is there not something more
going on in the exchange than simply an assertion of rights, a
protest at 'severe ill-treatment?'
Reading her testimony over against a work of testimonial
literature, where testimony is produced under comparable
constraints, I will suggest an essential link between her affirmation
124
Ambiguities ofMourning
and justice as responsibility before the dead through a claiming
offuneral rites, an affirmation which leaves the process open, for
the making of new claims, for the invention of new rights. It is
significant that, in contrast to the work we are about to read, a
black 'subaltern' woman is the one doing so, as she exposes fissures
between custom and the law.
Hearingl Reading Testimony
Transgressions of custom, in a denial of funeral rites, are part
and parcel of the history ofcolonial and apartheid South Africa.
Executed prisoners were not the only ones affected. One thinks
of restrictions on the funerals of political activists - a flashpoint
ofanti-apartheid struggle in the 19805 - and ofthe secret disposal
ofbodies in order to preempt political funerals (Krog 1998~ 204).
What interests me more than those restrictions is how well-
meaningattempts to 'let the victims be heard' - such as the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission - sometimes risk repeating the
offence.
Paralleling the exchange before the Truth Commission
between witness and questioner, the informant-transcriber
relationship in testimonial literature registers problems of
advocative representation vividly, though in sometimes
unexpected ways. Recent work on Latin American testimonios
has moved from an emphasis on constraint to an awareness of
agency. Doris Sommer (1996), for example, has made readers
aware ofhow, in her testimonio, L RigobertaMenchu (1983), Nobel
Prize-winning Guatemalan activist Menchu alludes to, and
withholds, certain 'secrets' from her transcriber-interlocutor and
readers. The work I will discuss is autobiography; in South Mrican
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writing a more established genre than collaborative testimonial
narrative.23 In autobiography, the position corresponding to the
transcriber, or questioner, is occupied by a presumed addressee.
At this level parallels can he drawn. Revolving around mourning
and commemorating the dead, and addressing a reader conversant
in the language ofhuman rights, Bloke Modisane's BlameMe on
History (1963), is an excellent starting point for exploring parallels
between testimony given before the Truth Commission and
witnessing in literature.
Invoking the UN Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights,
and the Declaration of the Rights oEMan, Blame is, at one level,
a classic work of protest (Modisane 1986: 122, 309-10). From
the first page, however, another story begins to emerge, as the
autobiographical narrator contemplates the destruction of
Sophiatown, a vibrant hut violent black residential enclave near
the heart ofJohannesburg - South Africa's Harlem perhaps, if
one thinks of the Harlem of the Harlem Renaissance.24
Sophiatown was bulldozed in 1958 in a campaign of forced
removals, making way for a working-class white suburb obscenely
called TIiomf (Triumph).25 The 'cover story' of anti-apartheid
does not stop a subtext, associating Bloke and his father, to emerge
from the destruction ofSophiatown.
Modisane writes: 'Sophiatown was like oneofits own many
victims; a man gored by the knives of Sophiatown, lying in the
open gutters, a raisin in the smelling drains' (Modisane 1986:
5). His father, Joseph Modisane, was one ofSophiatown's victims,
knifed to death following a barroom quarrel: 'the battered and
grotesquely ballooned nightmare, hardly recognisable as a human
being, was my father; the swollen mass ofbroken flesh and blood,
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which was his face, had no definition; there were no eyes nor
mouth, nose, only a motionless ball' (Modisane 1986: 26}.Joseph
Modisane and Sophiatown are thus textually associated in death,
an association into which Bloke is also drawn.
The first sentence of the book reads: 'Something in me
died, a piece ofme died, with the dying ofSophiatown' (Modisane
1986: 5), a cryptic statement in the context ofBloke's relation to
his father. By accident, Bloke's given name - William - is written
on his father's coffin: 'The shock ofseeing my name and not my
father's on the coffin confused and frightened me, but it seemed
symbolic somehow; I was officially dead, something I was later
to exploit emotionally (Modisane-1986: 31). 'William's death is
confirmed as the bulldozers move in: 'Something in me died, a
piece ofme died, with the dying ofSophiatown'. Name and face
coincide: 'I have no face, I have no name, my whole existence
slithers behind a mask called Bloke' (Modisane 1986: 75). The
Bloke name/face substitutes for the name/face which died with
his father.26 Modisane's autobiographical project, making himself,
is to recreate the face of his father, 'to bring back that face'
(Modisane 1986: 53).
The death ofJoseph Modisane is a calamity for Bloke and
his immediate family. u~We are cast-offs in the wilderness",
Ma-Willie [his mother] said, in Sesutho, "We are orphans, our
shield is gone») (Modisane 1986: 27; my emphasis). Bloke leaves
school, 'a fourteen-year-old man responsible for a family offour'
(Modisane 1986: 28). Who does Modisane blame? Does he blame
himself on history alone? Does he invite us as readers to do so?
Modisane blames not only the state for destroying Sophiatown,
and for killing his father, but reproaches his father for being killed
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and for leaving him to take care ofhis mother and siblings. With
Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, Joseph Modisane stands in the way
of his son 'ris[ing] above ... certain levels of labour' (Modisane
1986: 81), as Verwoerd's 1954 Address to the Senate on Bantu
Education so crassly put it (Verwoerd 1964: 77-78). In a profound
irony, in a layered work of protest, Joseph Modisane stands as
co-accused, along with H F Verwoerd. Read with Modisane's
short stories, Blame is not simply political protest, but enlists its
readers in order to reach his father, to recreate his name and his
face. 27
Over and above testimony to human rights violation, as
autobiography Blame attempts to lay Joseph Modisane to rest.28
This labor of mourning remains largely hidden to critics who
read for protest or resistance (see Sanders 1994: 64 nl). By
contrast, when witnesses come before the Truth Commission to
conclude works ofmourning, they do so, it would appear, openly.
Custom, or customary rites of mourning, so it would seem, are
not at odds with the law - as they are in Antigone, and as they
appear to be in the reception of Blame, insofar as protest is a
genre which favors representative testimony to the widespread
violation of human rights over the more complicated
psy<;hodynamics, for example, of mourning - which sometimes
involve anger at the one who died.
Let us return to the testimony of Lephina Zondo. As a
petition for funeral rites, Lephina Zondo's appeal extends the
scope of its founding assumptions about rights violation. Like
Chile's National Commission onTruth and Reconciliation, which
distributed its report with a letter from the President to the next
ofkin ofeach victim, the Truth Commission is in effect prepared
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to JOIn in the work of mourning. 29 As presiding Truth
Commissioner Alex Boraine promises: 'Mrs Zondo, we will
certainly consider your request and we will very definitely be
able to get hold of the death certificate so that you can have ie.
Yet when Boraine says the Com:mission 'will ... make
enquiries' into whether the family can have access to their son's
body, he reinvokes, ironically, the very system of laws which
disrupted customary practice in the first place: 'I'm really not
sure what the law is'.
The Commission's handling ofLephina Zondo's evidence
has been criticised by,Premesh Lalu and Brent Harris - the
historians who brought her intriguing testimony to wider
scholarly attention - for its legalistic approach to evidence. In a
provocative analysis, they draw parallels between the trial of
Andrew Zondo, where Fatima Meer's sociological defence was
rejected by the apartheid court, and the reception ofhis mother's
testimony, which is dryly summarised by the Commission's
Research Unit. The Truth Commission, they conclude, 'render[s]
[her] voiceless', ignoring her 'allusion' to 'our custom'. Invoking
the Subaltern Studies group, they propose that: 'Perhaps this is
one instance where the testimony of subalterns seems
incompatible with a process that is deeply rooted in modernity'
(Lalu & Harris 1996: 35-36; trans. modified). To put things
briefly, I am not sure that, in a country where culture is irrevocably
hybrid, one can speak so assuredly about an incompatibility of
'custom' and modernity; or, in this case, about the silencing ofa
subaltern witness. I will attempt a different tack.
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Women And The Crisis Of The Customary
As I have noted, women are often the witnesses whocla-im a
restitution, before the Commission, ofbodies or body parts. This
parallels Antigone, where the figure of a woman confronts the
law of the state for violating custom by denying funeral rites.
Without forgetting the differences I outlined earlier, but indeed
taking them into account, how are the valid parallels significant?
In the light of Lephina Zondo's invocation of 'custom', we can
make some observations, and track how testimony to the violation
of custom relates to a process conceived /and legislated on the
basis of universal human rights.
As I have said already, in post-apartheid South Africa,
custom is a mixed blessing. Under colonialism and apartheid,
'tradition' and 'custom' were, in part, entities 'invented' in order
to serve a system ofdomination (see Ranger 1983, 1989, Marks
1989, Anonymous 1989). This is an order Hegel seems not to
have anticipated. That troubling legacy is still with us; the
authority of 'traditional leaders' and 'customary law' lives on in
Soutnern Africa. As Mamdani reminds us, SouthernAfrica shared
with Equatorial Africa a colonial system of'indirect rule' mediated
through a political manipulation of the 'customary' and the co-
optation oflocalleaders.30 Post-apartheid South Africa thus faces
problems no different from those ofpost-independence societies
in other parts of Africa; namely, a deracialisation of national
government, without a corresponding democratisation at the local
level, where a 'customary administrative apparatus may still apply
to Blacks.31 Such a racially 'bifurcated state' clearly contradicts
the democratic,- non-racial vision ofa post-apartheid South Africa:
to be post-apartheid is not necessarily to be postcolonial. Where
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chiefly rule is autocratic and hereditary; and rural black women
subject to legally codified patriarchal authority, 'custom' may
present a dear barrier to democratisation.
What does the 1996 Constitution say about traditional
leaders and customary law? 'The institution, status and role of
traditional leadership, according to customary law, are recognised,
subject to the Constitution' (Constitution ofthe Republic ofSouth
Aftica 1996, subsection 211 [1]). Implicitly recognised is a history
oflegislative codification and amendment, and case law, in which
African custom is effectively; as under colonialism and apartheid,
subject to state lawmakers: 'A traditional authority that observes
a system ofcustomary law may function subject to any applicable
legislation and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal
of, that legislation of those customs' (subsection 211 [2]). The
fact that 'customary law' received the constitutional recognition
it did is thanks to lobbying by traditional leaders at the Multi-
Party Negotiating Process, the talks leading to the drafting of a
preliminary Constitution (Constitution ofthe Republic ofSouth
Africa 1993). The chiefs attempted to have customary law
exempted, as it is from anti-discrimination laws in Zimbabwe
(Maboreke 1991: 219, Currie 1994: 149), from the equality
provisions in the Bill of Rights:
During the debate on th~Bill ofRight in August 1993, a member
ofone ofthe tradidonalleaders' delegations, ChiefNonkonyana,
objected to the equality provisions in the Bill ofRights, stating
that, as a traditional leader, he did not support equality for
women. The Chief's demand" that customary law be excluded
from the Bill of Rights was linked to a second claim for the
recognition ofthe status and powers oftraditional leaders. Both
131
Sanders
ofthese claims brought the traditional leaders into conflict with
women fighting for the principle of gender equality to be
entrenched in the interim Constitution (Albertyn 1994: 57).
The Women's National Coalition (WNC) lobbied to
ensure that the equality clause in the Bill of Rights included
reference, noton-Iy to race but also to sex. That put them into
direct conflict with the 'chiefs' over customary law. The Bill of
Rights also recognises a right to language an~ culture: 'Everyone
has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural
life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so
in a manner inconsistent with any provision ofthe Bill ofRights'
(Constitution ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa 1996 section 30).
The clause could, the WNC realised, be interpreted in favor of
customary law. Led by the Rural Women's Movement in this
issue, the WNC made the demand that 'not only should equality
apply to all groups but it should trump claims to culture and
custom that. justified discrimination against women' (Albertyn
1994: 59). Although customary law is subject to the Constitution,
and the right to language and culture to the Bill of Rights, the
effort by the WNC to include an '.equality trump' was
unsucc~ssful. Women are left with a Constitution which, like
the salaried traditional leaders, makes no distinction between
codified and non-codified versions of customary law. As things
stand .t}ow, constitutional review must decide on a case..by-case
basis what aspects of customary law are legitimate.
How does this apply to the testimony under discussion?
One could simply object that invoking 'custom' is retrograde; oc,
conversely, one could ~riticise, with Lalu and Harris, a legalism
which seems to ignore it. But another way of reading Lephina
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Zondo's invocation of 'custom' is to view it as performatively
bringing the ·'customary' to crisis - insofar as it is a system of
domination -by claiming 'our custom' (umkhuba wethu) in a
context where that claim will be - or ought to be - accorded
equal consideration; where it will not he used to deprive the
claimant offull citizenship, as it may have been under apartheid,
with its system of ethnic Bantustans. For most black South
Africans, culture and 'custom' are hybrid; Modisane, the dty-
dweller, has to learn what he has to do at his father's wake
(Modisane 1986: 28). We would be wrong to assume that
something 'authentic', untouched by modernity or Christianity,
is being invoked. Ethnic purity is apartheid thinking. What is
crucial here is that 'our custom' (umkhuba wethu) - our habit,
our way of doing things - is being asserted. Equally crucial is
that what is being asserted probably has nothing to do with
'cust0tIlary law. 32 The word-being used is not isiko, the synonym
used when making reference to ',customary law' (umthetho
ophathelene namasiko). Umkhuba wethu is affirmed in a context
where that way of doing things is to be granted equal
consideration. This can be read as an implicit critique ofunequal
aspects ofcustom, and ~ exposing the structural inequalities of
, I 'customary aw.
Given that it is a black subaltern woman who brings the
'customary' to crisis, what are the specific implications for women?
Each case is different, and generalisations therefore risky. We can
nevertheless ask: Ifblack women are, in certain cases, subordinated
not only as Blacks under customary law, but also as women, does
an appeal to 'custom' or 'tradition' before the Truth Commission
not also bring the customary to crisis in terms of its 'official'
patriarchal structure - since, before the Commission at least, a
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womans claims enjoy equal status; and since customary authority
is not the authority before which appeal is made? Does this
represent the makings of a democratisation of custom, and of
culture? Are black women exemplary agents ofthis process, being
even more ambiguously positioned in relation to the customary
than black men?
It is in this affirmation and implicit critique that a black
woman brings the customary to crisis, by exposing the rift between
custom and law; by showing the customary to be a zone of
exclusion from the sphere of civic law; and by showing black
women to be marginalised in this zqne even more than black
men. By introducingAntigone, in cross-disciplinary fashion with
Hegel, we can note that the appeal for proper funeral rites does
two things: first, it hearkens to an appeal of the other in the
other - the other of the law in the law; second, responding to the
call ofchis other - from the place ofthe deceased - can be read as
an instance ofresponsibility before the dead. This is what Derrida
sets as a precondition for thinking 'justice'.33
Provisionally, we can say that, at a political level, those
witnesses who claim bodies, and body parts, extend, by their
testimony, the human-rights briefofthe Truth Commission. This
is something like the 'test[ing] out [of] rights which have not
been incorporated in it' which Claude Lefort (1986: 258) sees as
characteristic of the democratic state. A consideration of claims
for funeral rites shows that an affirmation of 'custom' does not
have to be in conflict with the law, as it is in Antigone, and in a
more mediated form in Hegel; or with full citizenship, as it often
was under colonialism and apartheid. Modisane's Blame Me on
History, as testament and autobiography, shows us how the more
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complicated dynamics ofmourning supplement currents ofsocio-
political mobilisation. Literature exceeds and supplements history.
Exceeding the task it was -assignedt by helping with the work of
mourning, the Commission brings to light wider tendencies of
social change, and deeper-running fissures in the post-apartheid
South African polity, not all of which are a legacy only of the
apartheid era, let alone the Commission's period of reference.
Deracialisation will only be followed by democratisation if
custom, as recognised by the state, is separated fully from
'customary law' and from officially-recognised hereditary and
patriarchal 'traditional leaders'. And only ifwomen are able affirm
'custom' in ways which do not position them, as speaking subjects,
as subordinate in systems which deny them full citizenship. The
testimony of Lephina Zondo, an assertion of 'custom' at
proceedings in which equality of consideration is, or ought to
be, operative, can thus, in this larger context, perhaps also be
heard as an implicit critique ofcustomary law, and of its specific
impact on women.
I have insisted on the qualification: equality of
consideration ought to be operative. It is here that, as the law is
provoked, the parallels with Antigone run deepest. According to
Hegel in the Phenomenology, Antigone, as woman, is the 'eternal
irony of the community' (ewige Ironie des Gemeinwesens) (I 977:
288, 1970: 352, trans. modified). Recently, in The Gift ofDeath,
Derrida relates Hegel's pronouncement to the original Greek sense
of irony as eir ne/a, and to the elr n: the dissembler, the one who
feigns ignorance in order to make the law speak (Derrida 1995:
76-77). If Antigone is an elr n, perhaps Lephina Zondo, and
others asking for funeral rites withheld, affirming custom before
the law, are too.
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'fm not ... sure what the law is', Truth CommissionerAlex
Boraine says.




Earlier versions of this essay were presented as a seminar at the
Columbia University Institute of African Studies (September
30, 1997), and as papers at the Law, Culture and Humanities
Conference at Georgetown Law Center, Washington D.C.
(March 27-29, 1998) and the 7th Annual British
Commonwealth & Postcolonial Studies Conference at
Statesboro, Georgia (May 8-9, 1998). I would like to thank
Nigel Gibson at African Studies for inviting me to present a
seminar, and to the organizers ofthe two conferences for giving
me the opportunity to share my work. My thanks go to Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak for-her constant transformative questioning,
and to Penelope Pether and Martha Minow for comments on
the first draft of the essay. I would also like to thank Howard
Varney for his conversation, and for reminding me about
'traditional weapons.~ Special thanks go to Robert Burt and
Renee De Mateo ofYale Law School for allowing me to borrow
the School's videotapes of Truth Commission SpecialReport, and
to Sias Scott at the-South African Broadcasting Corporation for
making available to me the master videotape ofLephinaZondo's
testimon)'.
A note on the significance of these dates: 1960: the declaration
ofa nationwide State ofEmergency by H.E Verwoerd's National
Party government, which led to the massive and increased state
repression of anti-apartheid organizations, including the






elections are held for the first time, in which an Mrican National
Congress majority effectively marks the end of National Party
rule and the apartheid era.
The amnesty provisions were challenged in the Constitutional
C~urt: Azanian Peoples ·Organisation (Azapo) and Others v.
Presid~nt ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa and Others, 1996 (4) SA
677 (Ce)..
Khulumani is attached to the Centre for the Study ofViolence
and Reconciliation at the University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg (www.wits.ac.zaIwits/csvr/khuluman.htm. visited
June 14 1998).
Some witnesses testified publicly before the Argentine National
Commission on the Disappeared (Taylor 1997: 141). The
proceedings of Chilean Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation, however, were not held publicly (Krog 1998:
238).
'Nason [Ndwandwe) sit is his garage, drinking beer and brooding
over what happened. He says, in a hoarse voice, 'Phila [his
daughter] has not been accepted into the fold of the ancestors.'
He has talked to the ancestors to seek their advice. They say
that the manner in which she died - so far from home, in such
barbarous circumstances, among strangers - means that she
cannot come home to her resting place among them. 'I must
cleanse her,' he says. He must wash the blood from her bones to
make her acceptable to the ancestors, and plead, 'Please accept
her.' Until then, she is wandering alone, above us somewhere,
in the humid Durban night' (Ignatieff 1997: 87); 'In the late
afternoon, when the bones [of their son, Bafana Mahlombe]
had been placed in a proper coffin, the Mahlombe family said
they were finally satisfied. Like many Zulus, they believe that a







This is implicitly acknowledged by Du Preez in his introductory
remarks: 'Many black mothers and widows have told the Truth
Commission that they would only be able to make peace with the
loss oftheir husband or children ifthey couldgive them a proper
burial Many thought this was a black cultural thing. But this
week those at the Truth Commission hearings at Klerksdorp
were reminded of how similar we are in our basic emotions'
(Truth Commission Special Report September 29 1996, first
emphasis mine).
Adapted from the transcript of the translated testimony of
Lephina Zondo before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, as recorded by the South African Broadcasting
Corporation, Durban, May 10 1996 {reproduced in Lalu &
Harris 1996: 30-32, trans modified).·A note on the ellipses:
three points indicate ellipses in Lalu and Harris; four indicate
additional ellipses made by me. The official transcript, which
differs from that in Lalu & Harris, and. in which Lephina Zondo
is referred to as Lupina Nozipho Zondo, is available on the Truth
Commissions website (www.truth.org.za. visited July 221998).
According to the Prisons Act 1959, s35:
'(4) (a) The body of an executed person may, in the discretion
ofthe Commissioner; be placed under the control ofan inspector
of anatomy to be dealt with in accordance 'with the provisions
of the Anatomy Act, 1959 (Act No. 20 of 1959), or be handed
over to.a medical school which is legally entitled to be in
possession ofhuman corpses.
(b) Ifsuch a body is not disposed ofunder paragraph (a) it shall
in the discretion ofthe Commissioner be buried in private) either
by the authorities ofthe prison where the execution took place,
or by the near relatives of the deceased under the supervision of
the said authorities, and in either case the Commissioner may
in his discretion permit near relatives ofthe deceased to be present





'Aiken had thought he would remain until the day of the
execution and he had thought that he would be allowed to say a
prayer over his grave. But in the little office, in the prison, the
warder told him; 'He will be executed on Tuesday. You can't see
him after the execution. The prison will hold a service for ten to
fifteen minutes. Then his body will be taken to the graveyard.
You can buy a small bouquet and leave it here. We will put it on
his coffin. Ifyou want to see the coffin, you can see the coffin
but you can not see your son in the coffin'.
Aiken listened and the pain was so intense in his heart that he
thought it would squeeze dead. His eyes dosed a moment and
when he opened them, they were mercifully dry.
'IfI want to see a coffin, I can go to Doves funeral undertakers.'
He left the prison. He did not stay tillTuesday as he had planned
to. Instead he left for Durban by bus' (Meer 1987: 170).
I would like to thank Lynette Hlongwane for her assistance with
the original Zulu ofLephina Zondo's testimony. I cite here the
unedited South African Broadcasting Corporation videotape of
the Durban hearing of May 10, 1996. The SABC translator
renders 'umkhubti wethu' as 'our tradition,' which loses the
ordinary, everyday senses ofumkhuba as 'conduct,' 'habit,' and
so on. 'Custom' perhaps retains this sense, without doing away
with ambiguous connotations - of colonial manipulation and
even 'invention' - which it shares with 'tradition' in the Southern
African context.
Eugenia Thandiwe Piye, who is the next witness after Lephina
Zondo, also testifies to the execution of her son, Lucky Piye.
She corroborates Lephina Zondo's testimony: 'We didn't go to
the graveyard where he was buried. As Mama has already said
they wouldn't let us go. Those people who were with told us
that we will not see him - that we will never see them. We asked





hospital at Mamelodi. We used to go to Mamelodi and stay
there. We stayed there the whole day and we eventually realised
that they had buried them and we had to go back. We never saw
their graveyard where they had been buried. We were never even
given their death certificate' (Transcript oftestimony ofEugenia
Thandiwe Piye, given before the Truth Commission at Durban
May 101996, from the Commission website, WW\Y.truth.org.za,
visited July 30 1998).
When capital punishment was declared to be in conflict with
the Constitution in 1995, the Constitutional Court judges cited
various clauses in the Bill of Rights, which are consistent with
the UN Declaration: right to human dignit}', right to life, right
not to undergo cruel and inhuman punishment. They also cited
the African notion of ubuntu, or human reciproei~ See: State
v. Makwanyane andAnother 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
A useful way to think the relation ofGreece and the 'West' is as
an appropriation of a hybrid Greek antiquity for the purposes
of,Western' cultural, national and racial self-assertion in Europe
and the United States. As recent debates over Martin Bernal's
BlackAthena, and overMrican American appropriations ofEgypt
and Greece, have revealed, there are other historical possibilities
(Bernal 1987 and 1991, Lefkowitz and MacLean 1996). There
are ways in which Greek thought can be opened to dialogue,
rather than proscribed, which is simply a legitimation, by
reversal, of its 'Western' appropriation. As A A Mazrui writes:
'Europe's title to the Greek heritage is fundamentally no different
from Europe's title to Christianit}'- In these later phases ofworld
history Europe has been the most effective bearer of both the
Christian message and the Greek heritage. But just as it would
be a mistake to let Europe nationalize Christianity, it would be
a mistake to let her confiscate the hellenic inheritance. The








- the fathers not of a European civilization but of a universal
modernity' (Mazrui 1978: 97, quoted in Ngugi 1998: 5).
When, Polynices is buried, it is according to nomos; there is no
conflict to force a disjuncture between custom and law
(Sophocles 1984: 1.29, 1994: 1.25).
According to the Philosophy ofRight, laws are no more than
customs written down (Hegel 1991: 241).
Ngubane argues that the Zulu women about whom she is writing
occupy a position of'marginaliry,' between 'this world' and 'the
other world,' between the living and the dead (Ngubane 1977:
86). Drawing an analogy between mother, mourner and diviner,
she observes: 'The argument ... about the mother and chief
mourner being channels through whose bodies spiritual beings
cross from the other world and from this world to the other
world, applies also to the diviner, who is a point ofcontact with
the spirits who return to this world. Through a woman the
transition of spiritual beings is made. This point is crucial in
that it explains why diviners are women and why men must
become transvestites to be diviners' (Ngubane 1977: 88).
Of course, as Taylor notes, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
mobilized around the demand for the reappearance, alive, of
the disappeared: AparicitJn con vida (Taylor 1997: 183).
The discourse of the National Party and its ideologues in the
years leading up to 1948 register a phobia of 'blood-mixing'
(bloedvermenging) taken up from the Afrikaans academics who
drafted the landmark Carnegie Report on White Poverty (1932)
(see Carnegie 1932, Cronje 1945 and 1947, Coetzee 1991,
Dubow 1995).
This is also why it is important to note the limitations of
Hegelian theories of psychic or cultural colonization, which
depend on access, actual or promised, of the colonized to the
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civic life ofthe colonizer - an access available, ifat all, to a small
native elite. In this light, we would have to reread the writings
of, among others, Frantz Fanon (I986) and Albert Memmi
(1991). Exclusion means both an intensive political and





Gerontocracy and agnatic succession, a key component of
hereditary chieftaincy, are also in conflict with the anti-
discrimination clause, while chiefly rule, in a more general sense,
is in conflict with the democratic founding principles.
In countries subject to indirect rule, where custom and
customary law were distorted and even invented, cultural
affirmation and retrieval are faced not with a straightforward
conflict between indigenous custom and human rights. In post-
apartheid South Africa, as in many post-independence African
countries, it is not only a matter of whether to bring local laws
and norms into line with international charters (cf An-Na'im
1994), or whether to resist the tendencies of globalization (see
Sassen 1996: 88-98) in the name ofcultural difference in order,
for instance, to minimize the inroads into national sovereignty
of transnational capitalism, which is often heard speaking the
language of rights (cf Cheah 1997). The undeniable fact that
such interests try to hijackrights agendas should not lead us to
deny the fact that some striking affirmations of the principle of
rights - of what Hannah Arendt called 'the right to rights' -
have come from the formerly colonized-and the once enslaved.
Such affirmations, inscribed today, for instance, in the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (l981) (see Beyani 285-
6), can be given a genealogy dating back at least as far as the San
Domingo revolution, and Toussaint L'Ouverture's explosive
challenge to the French Revolutionary 'Rights of Man and







On Maurice Blanchot's The Madness ofthe Day in 'The Law of
Genre,' Derrida writes: 'This text also speaks the law, its own
and that of the other as reader' (Derrida 1992: 242).
There are a few instances. Perhaps the most fascinating is Elsa
Joubert's non~fiction novet Poppie Nongena (l980), based on
the tape-recorded testimony of a black South African woman.
Drawing parallels between Joubert's book and the testimonio
genre, Anne McClintock (1996) has explored related questions
ofnarrative agency. I analyze in detail elsewhere how the original
Afrikaans version of Poppie (Joubert 1978) foregrounds the
politics ofadvocative representation.
Sophiatown has been the subject of enormous recent critical
interest and celebration. Books and films on Sophiatown of the
last 15-20 years indude: books: Motsisi 1978, Matshikiza 1981,
Therriha 1985, Modisane 1986, Schadeberg 1987a and 1987b,
Chapman 1989, Nicol 1991, films: Rogosin dir 1994 (l959),
Have }Ou Seen Drum Recently? Nixon (1994: 11-41) draws
parallels between the Harlem renaissance and cultural vibrance
ofSophiatown.
In Marlene van Niekerk's remarkable novel, Triomf(1994), the
white residents ofTriomfare haunted by the ghosts ofthe former
inhabitants ofSophiatown.
Paul de Man designates the address to the dead person, and the
positing of his or her response, as the dominant figure of
autobiography: 'it is the figure ofprosopopeia, the fiction ofan
apostrophe to an absent, deceased or vo.iceless entity, which posits
the possibility of the latter's reply and confers upon it the power
of speech.... The dominant figure of the epitaphic or
autobiographical discourse is ... the prosopopeia, the fiction of








I cannot present this reading in full here. I refer readers to my
essay, 'Respondingto the "Situation') in Modisane's Blame Me
on History' (Sanders 1994).
One could read Modisane's autobiography as supplementing
the 'traditional' work of mourning. At the rebello, the wake
held for his father, he finds himself largely ignorant about the
ideas about death familiar to the other mourners:
'''Th h h ))e poor man as gone to t e ancestors.
They spoke in Sotho, Zulu and Xhosa, and most ofthe imagery)
and the relationships of the symbols intended, escaped me; I
made polite gestures that the catering help was asking for me'
(Modisane 1986: 29).
'The report was published in a book which was sent with a
personal letter from the president to every affected famil)'. The
letter was another important gesture in that it was addressed to
the individuals and pointed out where in the book the details of
their loved ones could he-found' (Zalaquett 1994: 52).
As Simons relates, the system of indirect rule was,· initiall~ not
universally accepted by colonial policy makers, who feared
strengthening tribal chiefs (1968: 15-26).
The democratization of'traditional rule' is discussed by Mokgoro
(1996), and by Motshabi & Yolks (1991).
Writing ata time when the Bantustans were being established,
Simons (1968: 51-2) insists on the political necessity, when
Whites authorize themselves to speak for Blacks, ofa distinction
between lown customs' and 'traditional law': 'Today many
Whites - politicians, officials, anthropologists, even missionaries
- would say that Africans wish to observe their 'own' customs.
The answer begs the question, however. The customs of today




The fact that, in South African literary histo~ this responsibility
can, at an earlier time, be located in a work written by a .man is
something which remains to be explained historically.
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